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Presidential Leadership
& the Separation of Powers
Eric A. Posner
Abstract: The presidents who routinely are judged the greatest leaders are also the most heavily criticized
by legal scholars. The reason is that the greatest presidents succeeded by overcoming the barriers erected by
Madison’s system of separation of powers, but the legal mind sees such actions as breaches of constitutional
norms that presidents are supposed to uphold. With the erosion of Madisonian checks and balances,
what stops presidents from abusing their powers? The answer lies in the complex nature of presidential
leadership. The president is simultaneously leader of the country, a party, and the executive branch. The
conflicts between these leadership roles put heavy constraints on his power.

While the topic of presidential leadership has
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fascinated political scientists and historians for decades, legal scholars have ignored it. Legal scholars rarely discuss “leadership”–of the president or
anyone else. They are concerned with the legal constraints on the presidency, not the opportunities that
the office supplies to its occupant. Moreover, in contrast to political scientists and historians, who find
it difficult to resist celebrating presidents who show
great leadership qualities, legal scholars almost universally take a critical attitude toward the president.1
And the leaders who commentators frequently judge
as “great”–including Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan–
receive the most critical attention. This is because
those leaders turn out, with a few exceptions, to be
the presidents who most frequently tread on constitutional norms. This raises a paradox. How can our
top presidential leaders also be major lawbreakers?2
To address this paradox, we start with the Constitution. The Constitution says almost nothing about
leadership. It does not identify a leader of the country, a head of state, or even a head of government.
© 2016 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
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By vesting the executive power in the president, it implies that the president is leader of the executive branch, but not that
he is the leader of the country or the government. Moreover, not everyone agrees
that the president is leader of the executive branch. Even today it is controversial
whether executive agencies must answer
to the president; the so-called independent
agencies like the Federal Reserve do not.
Congress sets up agencies and gives them
their marching orders, controls their budget, and routinely harangues their chiefs.
And, of course, Congress demands that the
president comply with its laws, citing the
Constitution’s Take Care Clause and Supremacy Clause. The text of the Constitution could be read to envision a president
who is merely an agent of Congress, one
who has little discretion to exercise leadership except perhaps over a small staff of
assistants.
The Constitution is hardly clearer about
Congress. It designates the vice president
as president of the Senate, but in constitutional practice, he is not its leader. The
Constitution gives the Senate and House
the power to elect officers, and the leadership positions in those institutions emerge
from that process. Even so, there is not a
leader of the House or the Senate in a meaningful sense. The real leadership positions
are held by the top party official in each
body; so Congress has four leaders, with
the majority leaders being something like
coequals. Finally, the Constitution does not
create a leader of the courts (though it refers in passing to a chief justice presiding
over impeachment trials). Congress created the position of chief justice, whose powers over the federal judiciary are limited.
Why does the Constitution say so little
about leadership? The founders sought a
more effective executive after the debacle
of the Articles of Confederation, but they
also feared an excessively powerful national government led by an imperial president

or by a tyrannical legislature. Their solution was to supplement elections with the
system of separation of powers. Elections
would ensure that government officials enjoyed popular support when they reached
office, but they could not, by themselves,
prevent those officials from accumulating
power while in office or using it to maintain their position and abuse the public
trust. The separation of powers addressed
this risk. Madison argued that each of the
three branches of government would compete for power and in the process constrain each other. The usual picture is one
in which the officials in each branch are
motivated to inflate their personal power
by expanding the power of the branch in
which they operate, and hence by resisting
the efforts of officials in other branches to
extend their power. Actions that seek to redistribute power–actions that would result in power being concentrated in one office or branch–would be blocked. Actions
that advance the public interest would
(presumably) not be blocked. A separate
executive branch would enable the government to act quickly and decisively, but because the executive would derive most of
its authority from Congress, it would be
blocked from expanding its power.
Consistent with the Madisonian structure, then, the Constitution–more by implication than by language–creates a group
of leaders, but no leader of the nation. The
government is a kind of institutional confederacy. The founders, who were wellversed in classical history, may have envisioned a system like the Roman Republic, where there were leaders but no leader.
The Roman Senate was a collective body,
and men with distinctive gifts like Cicero could emerge as leaders at critical moments. But leadership was fluid; it moved
from one person to another in response to
events. The most important office was the
consul, but there always were two consuls,
and they served only for a year. A dicta-
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tor could be authorized for short periods
during military emergencies. These and
many other restrictions on office-holding worked to block–or at least retard–
the emergence of charismatic individuals
whose power derived from their personalities, connections, accomplishments, and
family lineage, rather than from their temporary occupation of an institutional position. The Roman Republic survived for
centuries without a king. Men who sought
to become leaders, like Sulla and Caesar,
were seen as usurpers. The imperial leadership of Augustus and his successors was
not possible until the Republic collapsed.
But the founders’ aversion to a national
leader ran into trouble from the start. Even
while debating in Philadelphia, it was widely understood that the new country would
be led by a great man: George Washington.
And he would not be Speaker of the House
or chief justice; just as he was president of
the Constitutional Convention, he would
be president of the country. The selection of
Washington was an obvious choice. He was
not just the hero of the Revolution; he was
a natural leader who had earned the trust
of his officers and soldiers through many
years of wartime military service. The new
country’s best chance was to throw its lot
to a man who already enjoyed the trust of
the nation. And the position of president,
rather than House Speaker or chief justice,
was the obvious choice as well. Washington was a military man, and what the country needed was a military leader to protect
it from Indians, Europeans, and internal
dissenters. So while the founders drafted
a document that failed to recognize a national leader, they prepared the way for the
first and greatest national leader. The negation of presidential leadership was to be a
legal fiction.

The immediate resort to presidential leadership spelled trouble for the Madisonian
system. The system of separation of pow145 (3) Summer 2016

ers was supposed to allow decisive action Eric A.
by the executive while blocking it or any Posner
other part of government from acquiring
excessive power, but it has never been clear
how this system could work. The Constitution’s checks and balances simply make
it difficult for the national government to
act, whether for good or for bad. The basic problem with a government action–
whether a military operation, negotiation
of a trade treaty, or the construction of a
new canal–is that it creates losers as well as
winners. Vetogates enable potential losers
to head off government action that harms
them, but the more vetogates that are built
into the system, the easier it is for losers to
block actions that may be in the public interest. Even if the actions hurt no one at all,
people located at the vetogates can block
the action unless they receive special treatment. Separation of powers, which is distinguished from other systems like parliamentary government by the large number
of vetogates it creates, just leads to gridlock
and ineffective government.
The rise of presidential leadership, beginning with George Washington, only
partly ameliorated this problem. Washington alone entered office with a large
enough wellspring of trust to enable him
to use the office aggressively–and, even
then, he frequently acted with extreme caution, careful to consult Congress and follow
its laws even during emergencies like the
Whiskey Rebellion. Only a few successors
with exceptional talents–Jefferson, Jackson, maybe Polk–could overcome the barriers to government action, and they did
so only on occasion. However, perhaps
because the country was focused inward
during the first sixty years of its existence–
or perhaps because the party system would
permit new forms of cooperation among
the branches–the cumbersome structure
of the national government could be tolerated. State governments undertook internal development. Congress tended to give
37
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the president a free hand for foreign relations and military operations, when quick
and decisive actions were necessary, and
the gains from security or territorial conquest could be widely distributed. Otherwise, the national government was weak
and presidential leadership thin. The great
controversies over slavery were resolved by
Congress, not the president. And then the
system buckled. The country was saved by
Lincoln, the greatest leader since Washington, who ran roughshod over the Madisonian system in countless ways. But it was
in the twentieth century that separation of
powers gave way decisively to a system of
personalistic leadership by the president.
The evolution was not linear, but it was
unmistakable. Markers along the way included Theodore Roosevelt’s innovation
of appealing directly to the public for support rather than working through Congress; the concentration of presidential
power under Woodrow Wilson; the vast
expansion of the federal bureaucracy under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, including
the inauguration of a new form of administrative government; and the Cold War–
era consolidation of presidential control
over foreign policy and a vast standing
army. A subtle but important change was
that the locus of policy-making authority moved from Congress to the president.
While Congress continued to debate legislation, the president set the agenda. From
a legal standpoint, the expansion of presidential power took two forms: the enactment of hundreds of statutes that gave
the president vast discretionary authority (and large staffs to implement them);
and presidential assertions of unilateral authority under the Constitution. The
first required active congressional participation, the second, acquiescence; but
they were mutually reinforcing, and the
Supreme Court–after modest resistance
that ended with Roosevelt’s court-packing plan–gave its imprimatur.

While the separation of powers eroded,
the president’s personal authority expanded. Today, President Obama can use his legal and constitutional authority to implement many of the policies he prefers. He
still needs congressional authority for major legislative changes, but the president
initiates the debate by appealing to the
public and demanding support from the
thousands of people who owe him favors
for patronage and other benefits he has bestowed or has the capacity to bestow. He
leads his party, which also gives him authority over Congress when his party enjoys a majority in both houses, and influence over Congress even when he does
not. He nominates judges who advance his
ideological goals, and fills the top ranks of
the bureaucracy with his supporters. He
leads an institution that gathers and processes information (especially confidential
information) much better than Congress
can, and this informational advantage–
along with the fact that he occupies his office continuously while Congress comes
and goes–gives him the ability to set the
agenda and control the public debate, to
act and confront Congress, passive and divided as always, with a fait accompli.3
President Obama came to office promising economic stimulus, financial regulation,
universal health care, carbon-emission regulation, immigration reform, and reforms
to counterterrorism. He set the agenda;
Congress reacted. Congress gave him the
legislation he sought in the first three cases: the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Dodd-Frank Act, and
the Affordable Care Act. The second two
examples are of dual significance. Not only
did Congress acquiesce in the president’s
legislative agenda; it vastly expanded his
authority, and the authority of his successors, to regulate–that is, to make policy decisions–in the financial and health sectors
of the economy. While Congress refused to
give Obama the climate and immigration
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laws he sought, the president implemented his plans administratively, relying both
on constitutional norms of executive discretion and existing statutes that gave him
vast authority. The regulations were not as
far-reaching as the legislation he sought,
but they accomplished a great deal. Obama
also used his regulatory authority and his legal team to advance lgbt rights. Of all of
Obama’s major policy initiatives, the only
one that Congress has completely frustrated is his plan to shut down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay.
But the erosion of separation of powers
did not lead to the abuses that the founders feared. While his critics argue–often
with justice–that Obama has violated constitutional norms, the president is not a dictator; his policies have enjoyed the support
of popular majorities or large minorities. It
is a major irony that the presidents whom
historians and political scientists have declared great leaders have engaged in constitutionally dubious behavior on a grand
scale: Washington, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Lyndon
Johnson, Reagan. While Nixon reigns as the
greatest constitutional lawbreaker–and no
one, I think, would call him a great leader–
all the presidents who were constitutionally scrupulous have also been the most insignificant and are now forgotten. This raises
a question. If the separation of powers no
longer constrains presidents from committing abuses, what does?

The answer lies in the nature of presiden-

tial leadership, and the way in which the
psychology of leadership interacts with the
institutional system we have inherited from
the founders. While George Washington
was already turning the office of the presidency into the primary leadership position of the country, he did so from within
the separation-of-powers structure. Washington was, from the start, the leader of the
country–in defiance of the Constitution–
145 (3) Summer 2016

but he was also the leader of the executive Eric A.
branch. Consistent with the constitution- Posner
al structure, this meant that Washington
found himself frequently being opposed by
Congress. And then there was a development that the Constitution failed to envision. Washington soon found himself the
de facto leader of the Federalists. In later
years, when the party system fully emerged,
the president assumed leadership of the
party. The president became the leader of
three separate institutions: the country, the
executive branch, and a party.
To understand the significance of this
development, we need to examine the concept of leadership more carefully. Broadly
speaking, a leader is someone who can motivate a group to act in ways that maximize
the well-being of the group or promote its
values. Leaders typically face a collective
action problem among group members
who prefer to act in their self-interest unless they can be assured that all members
of the group will act in the group interest. The successful leader provides these
assurances. Leadership seems to depend
fundamentally on the ability of the leader to acquire and maintain the trust of the
group. As long as the group believes that
the leader will act in the interest of all its
members, and is intelligent and informed
enough to make correct choices, the group
will give the leader its trust, and the leader
will be able to lead by making choices on
the group’s behalf.
How do leaders inspire trust in their followers? A huge and inconclusive literature has failed to identify specific personality attributes or skills that are associated with leadership (though this has not
stopped thousands of educational institutions from offering courses in “leadership”).4 In practice, however, we can see
that the leader demonstrates persuasively
–through word and action–that he or she
shares the group’s interests and will keep
his or her promises. Most leaders thus de39
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pend on their reputation, which they build
up through a long career of demonstrating
success in different organizations and in increasingly large and heterogeneous groups.
Group members typically trust leaders because the leaders hail from their ranks, have
demonstrated integrity by keeping their
promises, and have shown competence by
making choices that advance the group’s interests. Nearly all American political leaders were born in America (and, of course,
the president must be by law), and all presidents have held office or other significant
leadership positions before being elected.
Presidents who are judged great leaders
overcome entrenched resistance to implement policies that advance the public interest; they do so usually by knitting together
a coalition of groups whose trust they have
managed to win.
People with identical leadership qualities can be greater or lesser leaders depending on the political contexts in which
they operate. Some authors emphasize the
large role of public expectations–which
are shaped in part by the behavior of previous presidents–and the way that a president’s biography and personality resonate
with the public at a particular moment in
history.5 Sometimes there is little scope for
leadership because the country is either
content or excessively divided; even an
exceptionally talented leader may in these
contexts accomplish little. When people
have diverse interests, policies that advance the interest of one group may harm
another. The leader, then, faces the challenge of compensating the harmed group
for its support, or promising to advance
future policies whose benefits will outweigh the group’s short-term losses. Circumstances also help define the interests
of the group. A population will be more
unified when facing a foreign threat than
when debating the progressivity of taxes.
This is probably why wartime presidents
are often remembered as great leaders.

Regarding the question of why presidents do not abuse their positions, the answer is connected to conflicts inhering in
the institutional arrangements that they
must manage. In place of the Madisonian triptych of executive-legislative-judicial, let me propose a different tripartite
structure: executive-party-country. And
in place of the Madisonian political equilibrium maintained by the interaction of
three opposing forces, consider a set of
concentric circles. The president remains
the leader of the executive branch under
the surviving detritus of the constitutional structure imagined by Madison. By tradition, the president is leader of the country and of a party. So the president is leader
of three different groups at the same time.
Remember that leadership depends on
maintaining the trust of the group. This
means acting in the interest of the group,
which often comes at the expense of people outside the group. When the president
acts as leader of the nation, the group consists of all Americans, while the outsiders
are foreigners. When the president acts
as leader of his party, the group consists
of party members, Democrats or Republicans. When the president acts as leader
of the executive branch, the group consists
of the members of the federal bureaucracy, including the military. This means that
members of one group may be excluded
from another group, and yet they all look
to the same person for leadership.
Consider, for example, President Obama’s
counterterrorism policies, including his use
of drone strikes to assassinate suspected
members of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.
Obama believes that it is in the interest of
the country to maintain these policies. Aggressive counterterrorism tactics have cost
Obama the support of some people in his
party, but they have helped him maintain
support among people outside his party.
More aggressive military policies make it
harder for Republicans to accuse him of be-
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ing soft on terrorism, of being a closet Muslim, or of disregarding American security.
Many of Obama’s policies advance his
party’s interests. Here I mean both the
party’s strategic interests and the values
the party stands for. Immigration reform
provides a good example. Democrats seek
to cultivate the support of Hispanics, and
most Hispanics support Obama’s executive actions to protect people who entered
the country illegally. Obama’s support for
the Dodd-Frank Act was consistent with
Democrats’ view that the financial industry should be subject to greater regulation.
The Affordable Care Act also advanced a
longtime Democratic position that health
insurance should be provided universally.
Obama, like his predecessors, must maintain his leadership of the country and his
leadership of the party, and it turns out that
strengthening his leadership of one group
hurts his leadership of the other. The mechanism is straightforward. When Obama
takes an action that advances the interests
of one group at the expense of another, the
losers of the deal begin to wonder whether
he has their interests at heart; they are more
inclined to distrust him, even as the beneficiaries’ trust in the president is strengthened.
The president’s leadership of the executive branch introduces yet another complicating factor. The federal bureaucracy
comprises two groups of people: political
appointees and civil-service employees.
Political appointees head the agencies and
fill their top ranks. Within this group, the
highest-ranked appointees must be confirmed by the Senate; lower-ranked positions can be filled by the president without
Senate approval. The president almost always selects political officials from the pool
of personal and party loyalists. And these
people expect to be rewarded for loyal service with future promotions, access to the
president, and plum jobs outside of government in think tanks and the private sector.
145 (3) Summer 2016

Civil-service employees are typically ap- Eric A.
pointed by agency heads who are not per- Posner
mitted to take partisan loyalties into account when hiring (and in any event, civilservice employees will stay in office long
after the administration turns over). Civilservice employees also vastly outnumber
the political employees, so while they are
nominally subordinate, their expertise,
mastery of institutional norms, and numbers ensure that they control most of an
agency’s day-to-day actions. They can also
embarrass their political leaders by leaking
confidential documents, complaining to
the press, dragging their feet when asked
to implement policies the president favors,
and threatening to resign.
This is why the risk that the president
could abuse power though the bureaucracy
is exaggerated. This risk plays a part in political discourse, and worries about it have
a distinguished historical pedigree. After
all, the Romans who helped bring down
the Republic owed their power to their
leadership over the army. In the end, soldiers were more loyal to the generals than
to the state. In 1951, Truman lost confidence in, and the confidence of, General
Douglas MacArthur, and some historians
have argued that the country approached
a coup d’état. In modern times, citizens
worry that the president can use the civilian bureaucracy to spy on them, stifle dissent, and interfere with personal freedom.
And there are still respectable commentators who see the military as a threat to political independence.6
But as we have seen, to lead the bureaucracy, the president needs its trust, and
maintaining the trust of the bureaucracy
is in tension with national and party leadership. Reagan was elected on a platform
that railed against burdensome federal
regulation, but he could not simply abolish the bureaucracy. He needed it to unwind some regulations while maintaining
others. Thus, he had to temper his criti41
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cisms once in office while still trying to appease the antiregulatory wing of his party.
Obama campaigned on a platform calling
for greater transparency of the bureaucracy, but has failed to follow through because
he needs the trust of officials who work for
him. In this case, Obama was willing to anger his party in order to appease the bureaucracy, whose assistance he needed to
advance policies he cared about.
Leadership depends on trust, but people
tend to distrust those who exercise power
over them–the president above all. Presidential leadership is constrained by deep
egalitarian and antiauthoritarian norms
that constantly replenish the well of suspicion from which the public draws when
it evaluates presidential rhetoric and action. The country was settled by dissenters, founded on revolution against a king,
and expanded by frontiersmen who contributed to a national mythology of selfreliance. While presidential leadership is
acknowledged as necessary, the actions
of the president and of contenders for the
presidency are subject to relentless scrutiny. This level of scrutiny has increased
over the decades in tandem with the rise
of presidential power. Today, the president
is stripped of all privacy, like the kings of
old whose bowel movements were examined by courtiers for signs of disease. Every aspect of his private life (with a partial
exception granted for his young children)
is considered a legitimate topic for media
scrutiny and public debate. This is meant
not only to assure us that our trust in the
president is not misplaced but, through his
ritual humiliation, compensate us for our
subordination to him. This tendency is everywhere, and the conspiracy theories that
surround every president–in Obama’s
case, centering on the question of whether he was born outside this country and
is secretly a Muslim–is only an extreme
version of it. In the United States, conspiracy-mongering by alienated political mi-

norities combines with pervasive egalitarian resentment among the wider public–
that a great man (or woman) lords over
all of us–to provide a checking power far
more significant than the paper barriers of
the Constitution. Day after day, the president must labor to retain the public’s trust.

The Madisonian system sought to pre-

vent government abuse by creating a set
of competing institutions that check the
ambitions of officeholders in each. The
theory is that if no branch of government
can dominate the government, then power will never be concentrated enough to
threaten real harm. But we can also understand this system in the light of the founders’ fears about dominance by charismatic
leaders like Caesar or Cromwell. Most of
the individuals who operate the levers of
power within the various branches would
remain faceless cogs in the Madisonian
wheelwork, while the handful of talented men who could distinguish themselves
would never obtain a national following, or
at least not for long. The system was constructed so as to block the emergence of
dominating leaders at the national level.
But Madison’s system failed because
it set up too many vetogates, rendering
the federal government unable to function effectively. It also underestimated the unifying power of national leadership. By the twentieth century, it was
clear that Madison’s system made it impossible for a national government to effectively regulate the new national economy, to provide for social welfare, and to
protect the country from foreign threats.
Activist presidents with outstanding leadership abilities dismantled the Madisonian system piece by piece, paving the way
for our current president-centered system of national administration. Our contemporary system heavily relies on the
magnetism, talent, and organizational abilities of sitting presidents, who are
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kept in check by public scrutiny, the media, and the challenge of leading different

institutions and groups in an enormous Eric A.
Posner
and diverse country.
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